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Abstract What explains the persistent growth of public employment in reform-era
China despite repeated and forceful downsizing campaigns? Why do some provinces
retain more public employees and experience higher rates of bureaucratic expansion
than others? Among electoral regimes, the creation and distribution of public jobs is
typically attributed to the politics of vote buying and multi-party competition. Electoral
factors, however, cannot explain the patterns observed in China’s single-party dictator-
ship. This study highlights two nested factors that influence public employment in
China: party co-optation and personal clientelism. As a collective body, the ruling party
seeks to co-opt restive ethnic minorities by expanding cadre recruitment in hinterland
provinces. Within the party, individual elites seek to expand their own networks of
power by appointing clients to office. The central government’s professed objective of
streamlining bureaucracy is in conflict with the party’s co-optation goal and individual
elites’ clientelist interest. As a result, the size of public employment has inflated during
the reform period despite top-down mandates to downsize bureaucracy.
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Public positions are expected to serve public functions, yet in reality they are often
created to support private interests. As Geddes states, BThe bureaucracy’s main func-
tion was not the provision of public service but the provision of private services^
(1994, pp. 45, emphasis added). Being excludable and reversible, public jobs are
especially amendable to targeting and exchange (Magaloni et al. 2007; Robinson and
Verdier 2013). Hence, in both competitive democracies and electoral autocracies,
politicians commonly exploit public employment to buy votes and to solidify hege-
monic parties (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Geddes 1994; Kitschelt 2000). However, in the
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case of single-party dictatorships, in which competing political parties and electoral
pressures are absent, we know little about whether—or how—politics drive the creation
and allocation of public employment. This article fills this gap by examining the
paradox of bureaucratic expansion following market liberalization in China.
Two patterns of public employment in post-1978 China are striking. First, the
number of public administrative personnel has risen steadily during the era of market
reforms, reaching a total of nearly 50 million public employees by 2007. To put this
figure in context, the total bureaucratic workforce in China is equivalent to the entire
population of South Korea. As China transitioned from a centrally planned to a market
economy, observers might expect to see a reduction of state presence; in fact, the
bureaucracy has grown dramatically, despite the central government’s repeated, vigor-
ous efforts to reduce it.
Second, the size and rate of public employment varied widely across provinces.
From 1997 to 2007, Tibet averaged 57 cadres for every 1000 residents, com-
pared to 27 in Anhui province. In 2007, Beijing recorded the highest spike in
public employment, an addition of almost a quarter million staff members, while
Qinghai province added only 4000 more positions in the same year. Some have
interpreted the growth of bureaucracy as evidence of the loss of central control
over local governments (Bernstein and Lü 2003; Lü 2000; Pei 2006). But there
has not yet been a systematic attempt to account for such striking regional
variance in public employment.
Existing accounts highlight several political factors that cannot satisfactorily
explain the national and regional patterns observed in China. The first centers on
the effects of party-based patronage among post-communist states. O’Dwyer
observes that bureaucracies in Eastern Europe experienced similar surges follow-
ing the fall of communism. He attributes this paradox to Bpatronage politics,^ in
which newly formed parties sought to secure support by disbursing public sector
jobs to their constituents (2006, p. 2). Grzymala-Busse (2007) finds that robust
competition prevented fledging political parties in Eastern Europe from exploiting
state administrations as a source of party largess, thus explaining less bureaucratic
bloat in competitive regimes. Although these accounts shed useful light on the
situation among post-communist democracies, they have limited applicability in
China, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains the only political party
in power.
A second set of explanations shifts the agency of patronage from political parties to
individual dictators and political elites. Authoritarian regimes are characterized by
personalist rule and dyadic patron-client relations, also known as Bfactionalism^ in
Chinese politics (Nathan 1973; Shih 2008). Dictators are known to dispense particu-
laristic benefits to loyal clients in order to strengthen and maintain personal power, as
depicted in the Bpolitical exchange^ model of dictatorship (Wintrobe 1998). Following
this logic, a study of the former Soviet Union argues that the leadership had allocated
the scarce resource of cars on the basis of political loyalties to Stalin, rather than the
objective criteria of Beconomic planning^ (Lazarev and Gregory 2002, 2003).
Yet a third body of theories point to non-political factors affecting public employ-
ment. According to Wagner’s Law, areas with a higher level of economic wealth and
urbanization should feature larger bureaucracies because complex economies require
extensive administration and thus more public personnel (Wagner 1883). Public
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employment is thus correlated with larger demands for public services provisions.
Further, some claim that the provision of fiscal transfers by higher-level governments
encourages localities to inflate hiring (Gimpelson and Treisman 2002; Shih and Zhang
2006).
My analysis seeks to evaluate the role of political and non-political factors in
shaping public employment within China’s single-party dictatorship. To do this, I
assemble an original dataset on sub-national (provincial-level) public employment.
To my best knowledge, this dataset, which draws on a primary source compiled by
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), provides the most comprehensive and reliable measure
of public employment in China to date.1 Bearing remnants of its socialist past, the
system of public hiring in China departs from standard public administrations in several
ways.2 Thus, it is important to understand the institutional details and the measurements
provided by the source before applying statistical analyses. To that end, interviews with
38 public personnel managers usefully inform my interpretation of the data.
I find evidence that political factors—in particular, the dynamics of party co-optation
and personal clientelism—dominate non-political factors in shaping the aggregate
growth and regional distribution of public employment in China. By co-optation, I
refer to strategic efforts undertaken by dominant political parties to align the interests of
the potential opposition with their own. A major political threat facing the CCP is
unrest among ethnic minority groups concentrated in the hinterland provinces. To co-
opt these groups, the CCP disproportionately expands cadre recruitment in minority-
dominant provinces that pose credible secessionist threats.
By personal clientelism, I refer to dyadic exchanges of loyalty and support for
particularistic benefits between individual patrons and clients within the party state.
Even as a hegemonic party, the CCP does not always act as a single cohesive unit that
strategically distributes resources to maintain the party’s power. The ruling party itself
is comprised of numerous political elites who are in competition with one another (Lu
and Landry 2014; Shih 2008; Shirk 1982), each seeking to extend his or her own
networks of power. Consistent with the logic of personal clientelism, I find that
leadership turnover at the provincial level substantially accelerates bureaucratic growth,
especially in the quasi-marketized segment of bureaucracy with the financial flexibility
for discretionary hiring.
Instead of viewing party co-optation and personal clientelism as substitutes for
each other, these two dynamics are better understood as a set of nested distributive
politics that characterize authoritarian regimes. In China, competing elites are
nested in a formal bureaucratic hierarchy. As a collective, the ruling party formu-
lates national policies of redistribution to exert control. Within the party, individ-
ual elites seek to advance their personal agendas and clientelist networks. When
1 In a separate article, I survey the available sources of data on public employment and explain why the source
used here is the most comprehensive and reliable. See Ang 2012.
2 For instance, in standard public administrations, the official number of public employees should equate the
actual size of employment. In China, however, there is a gap between state-approved and actual number of
public positions. Additionally, the concept and existence of Bcivil servants^ is relatively new in China,
officially introduced after the passage of the Civil Service Law in 2006. The vast majority of China’s public
administrative employees belong to an ambiguous, non-civil service category, which I term extra-
bureaucracies in this article. See Ang (2012) for an elaboration of these institutional differences.
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competing elites are nested within a formal bureaucratic hierarchy, national and
individual goals of distribution coexist in tension.
Once the nested nature of distributive politics in authoritarian China is highlighted, it
is no surprise that the bureaucracy has inflated despite top-down mandates to reduce it.
The central government’s professed target of streamlining administration is in conflict
with the party’s political goal of co-opting opposition groups and with individual elites’
recruitment of clientele through appointments.
The first section of this article discusses how party co-optation and personal
clientelism drive public employment in China. The second section introduces the data,
measurements, and descriptive patterns. The third section presents the results of a
multivariate analysis of the factors that shape public employment patterns. Finally, I
conclude in the fourth section with the implications for central-local relations and
bureaucratic reforms.
Co-optation and Clientelism in China
One-party (single-party and dominant-party) regimes combine strategies of institutional
co-optation and mass clientelism to survive (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Although
both co-optation and clientelism constitute exchange-based strategies, the targets of
exchange are different. Co-optation is carried out by ruling organizations to appease or
to win over opposing groups through the provision of particularistic benefits or power-
sharing arrangements (Blaydes 2010; Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2005; Malesky and
Schuler 2010). Co-optation may be carried out simultaneously with repression; but,
whereas repression involves sticks, co-optation entails distributing carrots. By compar-
ison, clientelism is targeted at individual citizens, rather than at dissident segments of
society, and material benefits are typically exchanged for votes (Hicken 2011). More
recently, clientelism has been employed by political parties on an organized scale to
ensure continuous re-election, which is termed Bmass clientelism^ or Bmachine
politics^ (Magaloni 2006). Patronage is a subset of clientelism, where patrons who
provide benefits are office holders or can access state resources (Hicken 2011; Stokes
2007).
Much of the literature on co-optation and clientelism centers on electoral regimes,
which are marked by formal political contests. However, in a single-party dictatorship
like China, where competitive national elections are entirely absent, co-optation and
clientelism takes on a different flavor. Being a single-party dictatorship, the CCP need
not contend or share power with other political parties. However, it fears unrest among
and challenges against its hegemonic power from restive segments of society. In this
article, I focus on the party’s co-optation of a subset of ethnic minorities (and I will later
explain this choice). However, it should be noted that the CCP has also attempted to
coopt other influential groups—most notably, wealthy private entrepreneurs—by
enlisting them to join the party or to serve as delegates in legislative congresses
(Dickson 2008; Tsai 2007). Within the CPP, national leaders may also co-opt indepen-
dent-minded regional leaders by appointing them to central decision-making bodies
(Sheng 2009).
With the rise of modern political parties, the literature on clientelism has shifted
from an earlier focus on dyadic patron-client relations toward Bmass clientelism^
St Comp Int Dev
Author's personal copy
(or organized vote buying), as seen in electoral autocracies like Mexico under the
PRI (Magaloni 2006). Given the absence of elections in China, clientelism con-
tinues to prevail in the form of Bvertical dyadic alliances:^ personal and instru-
mental ties of exchange between two individuals of unequal power and status
(Lande 1977, p. xx). In the Chinese context, such dyadic alliances can be found
among the highest ruling elites (Nathan 1973), within sub-national bureaucra-
cies (Hillman 2010) and in the grassroots of society (Oi 1989; Walder 1986).
Among elites, patronage networks aid survival in times of political purges
(Nathan 1973; Tsou 1995). Such ties are also closely connected to corruption,
as higher- and lower-level officials, along with wealthy capitalists, rely upon
one another to capture rents. Patronage is also a tool of policy implementation.
Within villages and urban work units, higher-level officials can count on clients
at the lower levels as Btheir most enthusiastic supporter [s] and helper [s]^ (Oi 1985,
p. 257).
Although party co-optation and personal clientelism have each been extensively
discussed by China scholars, co-optation and clientelism have rarely been examined
side-by-side. This is surprising, because as several classical studies reveal (Nathan
1973; Walder 1986), informal patron-client ties are nested within the formal hierarchy.
In Andrew Nathan’s words, Bthe hierarchy and established communications and
authority flow of the existing organization provides a kind of trellis upon which the
complex faction is able to extend its own informal, personal loyalties and relations^
(1973, p. 44).
Analogous to the dynamics of nested distributive politics in authoritarian China
is the Bbroker-mediated model of clientelism^ found in some democracies (Stokes
et al. 2013). At times a disjunction emerges between the distributive goals of
national party leaders and local brokers; the former prefers targeting particularistic
goods at swing voters, whereas the latter favors loyal supporters in their home
jurisdictions. However, the broker-mediated model features the national party
(equivalent to the central party state in China) and local brokers as two separate
and distinct actors. In contrast, in China, central authorities are known to be
divided into factions that hold one another in check. Each faction at the helm is
then vertically connected, level by level, to a vast network of subnational clientele.
The view of authoritarian party state described above defies the conventional
image of dictatorships, which equate the dictatorial regime with a particular
dictator or circle of ruling elites (Gandhi 2008; Wintrobe 1998). 3 I advance a
more disaggregated view of dictatorships. Simultaneously, I stress that informal
relationships are the invisible glue that binds the formal hierarchy. Thus, in the
next section, I discuss how two nested sets of distributive politics—personal
clientelism and party-based co-optation policies—jointly shape public employ-
ment patterns.
3 For example, Gandhi defines the dictators in communist dictatorships as the effective heads of government,
specifically, Bgeneral secretaries of the communist party^ (2008, p. 18). However, she acknowledges that this
is not a satisfactory definition because the heads of governments in dictatorships have multiple titles and may
not be effectively in charge even if they hold formal office.
St Comp Int Dev
Author's personal copy
Party Co-optation: the Ethnic Factor
As a single party, the CCP commands monopoly of power to co-opt groups that may
challenge its hegemony. The most common tactic is to urge influential and potentially
subversive individuals to join the ranks of the party and the administration (Li and
Walder 2001). In this analysis, I focus on the co-optation of ethnic minorities through
bureaucratic (cadre) recruitment. Why ethnic groups? China is populated by a majority
of Han people and has over 55 minority groups. Minority groups concentrated in the
hinterland western provinces, such as Tibetans in Tibet and Uyghurs in Xinjiang, have
fervently resisted national incorporation and repression. Protests, violent crackdowns,
and activities labeled by the CCP as Bterrorism^ have rocked the hinterland provinces,
posing a grave threat to national unity and regime stability (Kerr and Swinton 2008).
The logic of co-optation may be extended to other groups who have resources or cause
to agitate for political change, such as private entrepreneurs. However, in co-opting the
entrepreneurial class, the CPP doles out patronage in the form of party membership and
congressional seats (Dickson 2008), not full-time public jobs.
Party co-optation of ethnic minorities is an open policy that the CCP advertises with
pride as Baffirmative action^ (Sautman 1998; Zang 2010). Indeed, the prioritization of
ethnic politics is evident in the party’s organizational structure—the Office of Ethnic
Minority Affairs is a core party organ, which extends from the central level down to the
counties and townships. Mao Zedong, the CCP’s founding leader, pointedly expressed
the party’s rationale for co-opting minorities in a telegraph addressed to provincial party
chiefs in 1949: BState organs at all levels of administration should allocate slots based
on the population of ethnic minorities, absorb Muslims and other minorities in large
numbers who can cooperate with us to join the bureaucracy… It is impossible for our
party to do without large numbers of ethnic minority communist cadres^ (Mao 1978).
Ethnic co-optation in China takes a page from the former Soviet Union’s strategy of
ethno-politics. Indigenous cadres act as Bsanctioned political entrepreneurs,^ whose
personal success was tied to the success of the party (Roeder 1991). Giving minorities
positions in the party-state apparatus allows them to participate in decision-making and
to benefit economically from CCP rule. As intermediaries, indigenous cadres transmit
state policy to their communities and relay local sentiments back to higher levels.
Importantly, although the state administration in minority-dominant locales is headed
by an ethnic minority, the top post of party secretary is reserved for Han Chinese
(Bovingdon 2010, p. 449). Through this arrangement of dual leadership, the Han-based
CCP retains ultimate authority over the governmental hierarchy in minority-dominant
regions.
However, not all regions with ethnic minority populations should receive equal
preferential treatment from the central party leadership. As recorded in the China
Statistical Yearbooks, there are 20 among 31 provinces that register a non-negligible
share of ethnic minorities. Among them, only Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia are
hinterland provinces that share borders with a neighboring country. These three
provinces can credibly seek independence and build connections with transnational
ethnically based organizations (Bovingdon 2010). It is consistently reported across
studies of ethnic politics that ethnic nationalist groups and bloody crackdowns are
concentrated in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia (Bovingdon 2010; Bulag 2002;
Schwartz 1994). By comparison, the remaining provinces feature a diverse mosaic of
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minority groups (e.g., Miao or Zhuang), which are neither militant nor politically
organized. Minority groups in landlocked provinces like Gansu cannot feasibly demand
secession from the mainland. Although there may be occasional sporadic clashes in
these provinces, such tensions have not involved calls for independence or transna-
tional groups.
Personal Clientelism: the Leadership Factor
Communist dictatorships concentrate distributive power in the hands of particular
individuals—thus, personal clientelism is deeply embedded within the formal hierar-
chical structure (Oi 1985; Walder 1986). For Chinese officials, a foremost means of
securing power is to appoint favored candidates to office.4 As Hillman describes in the
context of a county government, BDispensing patronage allowed [local bosses] to
advance in the local state hierarchy and recruit supporters into positions beneath them
as they rose… These informal networks became an essential source of political power^
(2010, p. 5).
While it would be little surprise to find leadership turnover associated with
bureaucratic expansion, what remains to be known is the size of this effect. Two
features of China’s single-party system may generate a sizable accretion effect of
leadership turnover on bureaucratic growth. First, single-party dictatorships fuse
party and administration. They do not have a formal system of temporary political
appointees who are separate from the regular civil service. This institutional
feature means that any appointee becomes a permanent part of the party-state
bureaucracy, even after the appointing patron has left his or her original post for
another position, and these appointees accumulate with each round of leadership
turnover. Second, members of the Chinese bureaucracy enjoy de facto lifetime
tenure. Following communist ideological norms, cadres occupy a special
privileged position in society (Lee 1991). Expectations of an Biron rice bowl^
are deeply entrenched among public employees. Interviewees reiterate that remov-
al only happens if a cadre is proven to have committed grievous errors or crimes, a
rule that has become formally enshrined in the Civil Service Law.
Further, it should be emphasized that clientelism is not limited only to those at
the helm of power—each appointed agent may in turn appoint sub-clients to
office. China’s party-state hierarchy is massive and decentralized (Landry 2008),
with five levels of government. One may compare elites at each level of the
hierarchy to brokers. Opportunities and benefits emanate from the ruling party and
flow down through a layered network of brokers. As Oi observed in the context of
rural China, BComparisons may be drawn between socialist patrons and the party
bureaucrats… who become ‘political brokers’ through the distribution of party-
controlled goods. An essential difference, however, is that in the Chinese socialist
case there is only one party^ (1985, p. 263).
4 Political leaders also cultivate clients with businesses (Ong 2012; Wang 2013; Wank 1996). But, as my focus
is on public employment, I will set aside state-business clientelist ties in this article.
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Observable Implications
To summarize, combining my discussions above, I expect to observe the following
patterns in the empirical analysis that follows:
(1) All things equal, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia hire more public employees than
other provinces.
(2) Other provinces with minority populations do not hire significantly more public
employees than provinces without minority populations.
(3) Leadership turnover is associated with a higher rate of public employment
expansion.
While party co-optation of ethnic minorities through cadre recruitment and
clientelist appointments are both qualitatively established in the literature, my analysis
aims to evaluate the magnitude of these political factors in influencing public employ-
ment patterns.
Data, Measures, and Descriptive Patterns
For this study, I assembled a unique panel dataset on public employment from 1997 to
2007 using data compiled by the Ministry of Finance (MOF).5 The original data source
is aggregated at the provincial level, which means that the number of employees in each
province includes provincial and sub-provincial (cities, counties, and townships) em-
ployment. More details about the dataset are included in an online appendix.
The data used in this study offer several advantages. Among all the available
sources, the MOF data is the most comprehensive and accurate count of public
employment (Ang 2012). Instead of counting only selected government sectors, as
reported in the Statistical Yearbooks (Burns 2003; Lü 2000; Yang 2004), or the number
of officially approved positions, the data source measures the actual number of public
employees, both state-funded and self-funded through nontax revenue. 6 Also, the
dataset measures the number of personnel in the entire bureaucracy, not merely the
top layer of party secretaries and state chiefs (Guo 2009; Lu and Landry 2014). This is
worth emphasizing because leading officials, numbering about 500,000 individuals
(Walder 2004), make up only a small percentage of the entire bureaucracy of almost 50
million individuals.
I must make clear what is absent in the data source, which limits my analyses. First,
this is a province-level dataset. The original data source only reports the aggregated size
of public employment at the provincial level, but it does not break down the numbers
by sub-provincial levels of government. Second, this is not an individual-level dataset.
The original source reports total public employment by province, but there is no
indication of the identities of individual public employees (e.g., ethnic identities, party
5 The volume is titled Local Public Financial Statistics.
6 China implements a hierarchy-wide bianzhi system that sets an official guideline for the number of public
employees in each office. In practice, the bianzhi is only a guideline; actual hiring typically exceeds bianzhi,
especially if an office can generate extra funds (Ang 2012).
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membership, education levels). Third, there is no information about which person or
department is the hiring unit. The absence of individual level attributes of public
employees precludes fine-grained testing of the exact mechanisms of public hiring.
The data will only allow us to test the broad observable implications laid out in the
previous section.
Defining the Scope of Public Employment
My measurement of public employment follows the conventional approach of includ-
ing only employees in the public administration, excluding those in state-owned
enterprise (SOE) and the military (Gimpelson and Treisman 2002; Grzymala-Busse
2007; Heller et al. 1984; O’Dwyer 2006). Specifically, China’s public administration
consists of core party-state organs, which constitute the formal civil service, and an
array of subsidiary organizations labeled here as extra-bureaucracies (shiye danwei).
Extra-bureaucracies include regular public service providers like schools and hospitals,
but also offices involved in administration, regulation, fee collection, and the provision
of semi-commercialized services. 7 While core agencies are fully-funded with state
budget appropriations, extra-bureaucracies are not guaranteed state funding. Instead,
the latter can generate income by collecting regulatory fees and user charges or by
selling services for profit.
Extra-bureaucracies are an attractive vehicle for public hiring because they
enjoy more financial flexibility and looser recruitment rules than the formal civil
service. By virtue of their direct ties to supervising state agencies, extra-
bureaucracies enjoy quasi-monopoly privileges or competitive market advantages
(Ang 2015). Such organizations are not unique to China. Other post-communist
Eastern European governments also saw a proliferation of parastatal organizations
that thrived on concessions, licenses, and exemptions (Grzymala-Busse 2007, p.
159). Additionally, whereas there are written rules and examinations governing
appointments in the civil service, the recruitment criterion is looser among extra-
bureaucracies. Later, in my analysis, I divide public employees into two catego-
ries: (1) administrative personnel: employees of core party-state organs who
perform only administrative functions and (2) subsidiary personnel: employees
of extra-bureaucracies who play a mixture of administrative and market roles.
Patterns of Public Employment: Aggregate Growth and Regional Distribution
Figure 1 shows a relentless rise in the absolute and relative size of public
employment. In fact, the pace of expansion was faster following than before
market liberalization in 1978. This is paradoxical given the expectation that a
retreat from central planning should be followed by a reduction in the size of the
state.8 Moreover, the bureaucracy grew persistently despite five major downsizing
campaigns initiated by the central government in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, and
7 To give an example, the construction bureau is a state office. In a city of Jiangsu, the construction bureau
supervised 18 subsidiary extra-bureaucracies, including the construction projects assessment office, construc-
tion services center, relocation and moving office, and urban science research institute (AI 2007–107).
8 For a similar phenomenon in Eastern Europe, see Grzymala-Busse (2007) and O’Dwyer (2006).
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2003. Each time, authorities in Beijing would harshly criticize bureaucratic sprawl
and take draconian measures to curb its inflation. For example, during the 1998
downsizing campaign led by Premier Zhu Rongji, reputed to be a fierce reformer,
the central government abolished 15 ministries and slashed the number of depart-
ments in the State Council (the top political organ of the state administrative
hierarchy) from 72 to 53. Nationwide, the number of officially approved positions
(bianzhi) was cut by an impressive 47.5 %.9 And yet the actual number of public
personnel continued to climb.
Comparatively speaking, the total size of public employment as a share of population in
China is still smaller than in the OECD states and on par with countries in Latin America
(Ang 2012). However, the size of China’s sub-national public employment relative to
population is among the highest in the world. During the reform period, sub-national
governments constituted 84 % of China’s total public workforce. Notably, subsidiary
extra-bureaucracies hired an overwhelming share of public employees, about 80 %.
Public employment is widely distributed across the 31 provinces in China (see
Fig. 2). Between 1997 and 2007, the average province hired 1.44 million public
employees or 39 public employees per 1000 residents. Tibet has the highest ratio of
public employment at 57.20 per 1000 residents, compared to 26.64 in Anhui. Figure 2
shows the high density of public employment in the hinterland, minority-dominant
provinces of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia (TXM for short). There is a strong
correlation of 0.46 between TXM and public employment per 1000 residents, com-
pared to 0.08 with minority share of population. The provinces also varied widely in the
growth rate of public employment, as seen in Fig. 3. On average, 34,725 positions (or
0.58 public employees per 1000 residents) were added in each province, an annual
increment of 2 % over the previous year. Beijing and Hunan tied for the highest growth
rate at 1.36 public employees per 1000 residents. In the regressions that follow, I
control for a range of factors to isolate the effects of the predicted variables.
9 BRepeated cycles of bureaucratic inflation,^ Caijing Magazine, May 20, 2013.
Fig. 1 Growth in public employment, 1955–2007. Vertical lines denote the years in which downsizing
campaigns were implemented
St Comp Int Dev
Author's personal copy
Fig. 2 Public employment per 1000 residents by province
Fig. 3 Change in public employment per 1000 residents by province
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Multivariate Analysis
In this section, I examine observable implications spelled out in the first
section, using a multivariate analysis of cross-sectional time-series data. I use
an OLS model with panel-corrected standard errors that correct for
heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation (Beck and Katz 2006). Dummies for
each year are added to control for year-specific shocks (e.g., a centrally
mandated downsizing campaign or ethnic protest). I specify the dependent
variable of public employment in two ways. First, to examine geographical
distribution, I measure the dependent variable as public employees per 1000
residents. Second, to study the rate of expansion, I measure the dependent
variable as change in public employees per 1000 residents and change in the
total number of public employees.
The key independent variables are as follows. To capture the ethnic factor, I
created a dummy variable for Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia (TXM). To
assess if these provinces have more preferential treatment than other provinces
with minority populations, I include an additional variable, share of minority
population. Next, to measure leadership turnover, I created a dummy variable
for new provincial leader in office. At every level of administration, the provincial
party secretary (chief of party) and provincial governor (chief of state) are the two
top political leaders. Whenever a new party secretary and/or governor arrive in
office, I record that as a change in leadership.
Control Variables
For control variables, I include population, GDP per capita, urbanization, local depen-
dency ratio, and total (elementary and secondary) school enrollment. Wagner’s Law
hypothesizes that more developed and urbanized locations will need bigger bureaucra-
cies to serve complex tasks of administration. Public employment growth may also
reflect a higher demand for public services. Dependency ratio measures the percentage
of local population younger than 16 and older than 64 years old. Presumably, the higher
the percentage of the local population who are young and old, the more demand there is
for public services (e.g., schools, clinics, and welfare centers). I also include the size of
school enrollment to isolate the effects of demand for public education, as teachers
make up a considerable share of public employment. To test for fiscal effects, I include
the previous year’s per capita tax revenue, fiscal transfers, and extra-budgetary revenue,
which are the three major fiscal categories in China. Finally, I tested the regressions
with a battery of other controls (including reported unemployment rates and regional
trade openness). As these were found insignificant, I excluded them for brevity. A
control variable for the capital city is not necessary as the data only count sub-national
employment.
The Ethnic Factor
The results of my analyses, presented in Tables 1 and 2, are largely consistent with
my expectations. I begin by examining how the ethnic factor influences regional
distribution of public employment. In Table 1, the dependent variable is number of
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public employees per 1000 residents (Models 1 and 2) and total number of public
employees (Model 3).10 Following Model 2 in Table 1, TXM hired 9.28 more
public employees per 1000 residents than other provinces, significant at the 99 %
confidence level. To place this result in perspective, consider the case of Qinghai
province, which has residents of Tibetan and Mongol descent but is a landlocked
province. Qinghai had 50.12 public employees per 1000 residents. If Qinghai is a
province that posed a credible instability threat (following TXM), the ratio would
increase to 59.4, an 18.5 % increase over the mean value. In other words, the
absolute effect of TXM is sizable. Controlling for all other factors, the provinces
of TXM had almost 200,000 more public employees than other provinces. By
comparison, share of minority population showed no significant effect. Consistent
with my discussion in the preceding section, the results show that minority
recruitment is concentrated only in regions that share borders with other countries
and are credibly destabilizing.
One may question if public employment is larger in the TXM provinces not as
a co-optation strategy—that is, to recruit more cadres in these areas—but as a
repressive strategy. It could be possible that the added positions went toward
building up local security forces. As I do not have a breakdown of public
employees by departments, I included share of spending on policy and security
as a proxy. Across all three models in Table 1, this variable actually posts a
significant negative effect, which suggests that increased public hiring does not
appear to be primarily about stepping up security forces. That said, repression and
co-optation should be viewed as complementary rather than substitutive strategies.
As one Xinjiang expert wrote, BThe Chinese government is ready to suppress
Uyghur separatism with an iron hand. At the same time, it may try to integrate the
Uyghur into the PRC regime… with equal opportunity programs^ (Zang 2010).
Another point to consider is whether more jobs may be assigned to Han
Chinese, rather than ethnic minorities in TXM, as a strategy to Bcrowd-out the
natives.^ As my data do not specify individual characteristics of public em-
ployees, I cannot tell to whom jobs were allocated. However, available national
descriptive statistics, covering an earlier period from 1951 to 1997, suggests
that my results are not likely to indicate a crowd-out-the-natives story.11 The
number of minority cadres and their proportion over total public employment
has steadily increased over the years. In 1980, there were about 1 million
ethnic minority public employees, 5.38 % of the public force. By 1998, there
were 2.74 million, with the share rising to 6.78 %. Over time, both the absolute
number and proportion of ethnic minority cadres in the public workforce have
grown.
10 A test of autocorrelation using the Wooldridge test finds serial autocorrelation in the residuals. This is
expected as public employment generally increases each year, so the previous year’s values are highly
correlated with the present year’s value. I correct for serial autocorrelation by adding corr(ar1) in the PCSE
regression. This method is preferable to adding a lagged dependent variable to the regression, as a lagged
dependent variable generates a highly inflated R2 value. As a robustness test, I ran the same analyses using
lagged dependent variable instead of the corr(ar1) command, and find similar results.
11 China National Organizational Statistics, pp. 1348–9.
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The Leadership Turnover Factor
Next, I turn to the effects of leadership turnover on bureaucratic size. First, observe the
impact of leadership turnover on the total number of public employees (Model 3 in
Table 1), with the average value of 1.4 million personnel. Holding other factors
constant, provinces that experience leadership change have 18,948 more positions than
Table 1 Determinants of public employment size, 1997–2007 (OLS with panel corrected standard errors,
adjusted for autocorrelation)
DV= public employees
per 1000 residents
DV= total number
of public employees
(1) (2) (3)
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia – 9.280*** 193,560***
(−1.03) (−27,497)
Share of minority population – −0.01 −92.39
(−0.01) (−510.80)
New provincial leader in office – 0.40 18,948**
(−0.25) (−9138)
Previous year fiscal transfers per capita (1000 yuan) – 1.831*** −84,319***
(−0.52) (−17,148)
Previous year extra-budgetary revenue per capita
(1000 yuan)
– 0.01 1513
(−0.14) (−3813)
Previous year tax revenue per capita (1000 yuan) – 0.85 −27,571
(−0.72) (−17,187)
Control variables
Population (10,000 people) −0.00198*** −0.00158*** 283.8***
(0.00) (0.00) (−22.91)
Urban share of population (%) 0.126*** 0.136*** 2134
(−0.04) (−0.05) (−1662)
GDP per capita (1000 yuan) 0.02 0.00 111.50
(−0.03) (−0.03) (−1441)
Local dependency ratio (%) −0.03 −0.10 −4837*
(−0.03) (−0.07) (−2550)
School enrollment (10,000 students) 0.00 0.00 33.63
(0.00) (0.00) (−130.10)
Public spending on police and security (%) −1.023*** −1.059*** −29,368***
(−0.31) (−0.29) (−11,357)
Constant 49.02*** 48.33*** 515,531***
Year effects No Yes Yes
Observations 341.00 310.00 310.00
R-squared 0.75 0.82 0.90
Standard errors in parenthesis: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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in other provinces. Then, in Table 2, I measure the dependent variable as the rate of
change in public employment. On average, almost 35,000 positions were added in each
province every year. Following Models 5 and 6 in Table 2, leadership turnover is
associated with a steeper rate of hiring that rises over the value of the constant by 0.53
public employees per 1000 residents, or in absolute terms, 23,554 positions. For
Table 2 Determinants of change in public employment, 1997–2007 (OLS with panel corrected standard
errors)
DV= change in
public employees
per 1000 residents
DV= change in
total public
employees
DV= change in
administrative
personnel
DV= change in
subsidiary
personnel
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner
Mongolia
– 0.12 12,254 5280 9487
(−0.38) (−9826) (−5804) (−12,630)
Share of minority population – 0.00 −84.48 34.77 −301.7*
(0.00) (−178.10) (−50.98) (−165.90)
New provincial leader in
office
– 0.525* 23,554*** −4656 24,821***
(−0.28) (−8816) (−4105) (−8187)
Previous year fiscal transfers
per capita (1000 yuan)
– −0.03 3403 −4808 3978
(−0.25) (−6337) (−3169) (−6657)
Previous year extra-
budgetary revenue
per capita (1000 yuan)
– −0.02 1244 35.18 1331
(−0.05) (−1151) (−1363) (−2325)
Previous year tax revenue per
capita (1000 yuan)
– 0.24 6122 −1359 12,239
(−0.39) (−12,075) (−3975) (−9201)
Controls
Population (10,000 people) −0.0003* −0.0003** −3.79 4.35 −3.11
(0.00) (0.00) (−6.66) (−3.53) (−6.46)
Urban share of population
(%)
−0.03 −0.04 −306.20 120.70 −1258**
(−0.02) (−0.03) (−812.60) (−283.40) (−612.40)
GDP per capita (1000 yuan) 0.01 0.00 55.26 −121.40 358.30
(−0.03) (−0.04) (−1580.00) (−289.50) (−1238.00)
Local dependency ratio (%) −0.0557* −0.0643** −1176.00 −174.20 −413.40
(−0.03) (−0.03) (−885.30) (−634.60) (−884.10)
School enrollment
(10,000 students)
0.00172* 0.00177* 75.24* −2.13 30.20
(0.00) (0.00) (−43.08) (−28.47) (−41.03)
Public spending on police
and security (%)
0.05 0.06 3885 −1764 3385
(−0.08) (−0.08) (−3335) (−1749) (−3360)
Constant 4.178** 4.745** 56570.00 31.00 31.00
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 310.00 310.00 310.00 248 248
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.54 0.436
Standard errors in parenthesis: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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example, in 2007, Fujian province registered a growth of 36,377 bureaucratic positions,
and there was no change in leadership that particular year. If there had been a change of
leadership in Fujian, then 23,554 more positions are expected to be added to the cadre
force. Evidently, the effects of leadership change on the absolute size and rate of
increase in public employment are sizable.
There is further evidence to suggest that accelerated bureaucratic expansion associ-
ated with leadership turnover is more an indication of clientelist hiring than policy
shifts among new leaders. In Table 2, I divide public employment into two main
categories: administrative personnel, who are appointed in core organs, and subsidiary
personnel, who work in extra-bureaucracies. Models 7 and 8 reveal that whereas
leadership turnover had no significant impact on the rate of growth among adminis-
trative personnel, it significantly increased hiring among subsidiary positions by
24,446. If increased hiring was primarily explained by the policy shifts of new
provincial leaders, then we should expect to see an increase among administrative
personnel, as these are bureaucrats who take on planning and leadership roles in the
capacity of formal civil servants. But, instead, we see that personnel expansion is
concentrated in the porous extra-bureaucratic sector. As earlier discussed, extra-
bureaucracies are more malleable than the core civil service as a source of clientelist
hiring because of the former’s financial and hiring flexibility (Burns 2003, pp. 798–
802; World Bank 2007, p. 38).
Why leadership change would bring about a seemingly large effect on the rate of
public employment growth, especially in the extra-bureaucracies, deserves further
consideration. Before speculating on the mechanisms, it must be emphasized that
although 23,544 positions seem like a large number in absolute terms, this figure
constitutes only 1.62 % of average public sector size in a province. Even in the absence
of leadership turnover, Model 6 of Table 2 predicts a baseline increase of 56,570
positions in the bureaucracy over the previous year. In other words, leadership turnover
accelerates an already considerable rate of bureaucratic growth. As my data do not
detail at which levels or by whom appointments are made, I am unable to test the exact
channels through which leadership turnover accelerates bureaucratic growth. However,
the existing literature offers several clues that shed light on the substantial effects
observed.
One possibility is that a new provincial leader may trigger new appointments at the
next lower level, and these clients in turn bring sub-clients to office, vertically and
horizontally. Patron-client chains were exposed during the recent downfall of top
officials, including Bo Xilai, former provincial party secretary of Chongqing. Bo
nurtured an expansive team of followers who implemented his now controversial
policies (including a police chief, Wang Lijun, who executed Bo’s violent crackdown
on underground gang members). Yet Bo himself was later revealed to be connected to a
more senior patron—Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo standing
committee and the national security czar.12 Zhou has since been charged with corrup-
tion and sentenced to life imprisonment. According to an investigative report in Caixin,
BZhou Yongkang sat at the center of a sprawling network of subordinates, family
members and business associates, many of whom have become the subject of inquiries
12 BDisgraced officials Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai formed ‘clique’ to challenge leaders,^ South China
Morning Post, January 15, 2015.
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themselves.^13 His network reached deep into the oil and gas industries, where Zhou
launched his career, and in Sichuan province, where he was appointed party secretary in
1999.
At the sub-provincial levels, a detailed case study by Hillman provides further
evidence that cascading appointments follow whenever political patrons secure new
offices. Describing one county, he reports, BAfter 6 years as district governor [the
political patron] was subsequently promoted to the powerful position of Deputy Party
Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee. From there he was able to continue to
ensure that his network dominated politics in the district and below^ (Hillman 2010, p.
6). This patron was said to have appointed protégés at the county and township levels,
and across party and state organizations, subsequently yielding Ba significant portfolio
of positions^ in the province (p. 7). In this instance, a county party secretary alone
Boversaw changes to no fewer than 130 senior and middle-ranking positions^ during
his 3-year tenure (p. 11). In short, while it is unlikely for a new provincial leader to
personally create over 20,000 positions, leadership change at the helm could trigger
hiring at the lower levels.
Another explanation for the substantive effect of leadership turnover on bureaucratic
growth is that in addition to hiring made by new bosses at each level, departing
incumbents may create Blast minute^ jobs in their final year of office. At the sub-
provincial level, this is a well-documented trend in the Chinese press.14 The organization
department of Zhejiang province issued a regulation forbidding city and county leaders
who are leaving office from Babruptly^ appointing new cadres.15 There are two reasons
why local leaders may scramble to hire before they leave. The first is that clients
appointed in a former jurisdiction could one day become useful, and clients retain
clientelist ties with their benefactors even if the two do not work in the same region or
office. This is amply demonstrated in ZhouYongkang’s network. Although Zhou left his
position as party secretary of Sichuan province in 2003 to become theMinister of Public
Security, he left behind a strong network of former aides in Sichuan who followed his
bidding. After Zhou was indicted for corruption, a string of top officials in Sichuan—
along with their lower-level underlings—were subsequently arrested and stripped of
power. Moreover, for local leaders, appointments made on the brink of departure are
virtually costless. Any fiscal consequence will be borne by their successors.
Regardless of the specific reasons that link leadership turnover to bureaucratic
growth, the discussion above bears out a central irony of the Chinese political system:
political elites themselves contribute inadvertently to bureaucratic expansion. For
decades, the central government strove to downsize. Echoing official pronouncements
about the success of downsizing campaigns, Yang claims that the central government
was more successful in reforming and streamlining bureaucracy in the post-1990s than
before (Yang 2004). In reality, the central government was only successful at cutting the
number of departments and officially approved slots. As we can clearly see in Fig. 1,
the absolute number of public employees ballooned over the years, despite repeated
campaigns to trim bureaucratic flab.
13 BZhou’s Dynasty,^ Caixin, 2014, accessed at http://english.caixin.com/2014/ZhouYongkang/.
14 See, BHebei Qinglong district party secretary abruptly appoints 283 cadres,^ Xinhua News, December 26,
2006.
15 See, “Zhejiang city and county party secretaries who are leaving office shall not abruptly appoint cadres,”
Ningbo Net, July 9, 2010.
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Control Variables
Several interesting findings emerge from examining the control variables. There is little
support for a functional explanation of public employment expansion. As we can see in
Model 2 of Table 1, urbanization posts a significant positive effect on public employ-
ment size, but GDP per capita shows no significant effect. Neither variable was
significant in Models 4 through 7 in Table 2. Indeed, prosperous and urbanized
provinces like Jiangsu and Zhejiang have among the smallest bureaucracies in the
country (see Fig. 2). The scale of public hiring also does not correspond with greater
demand for public services provision. Local dependency ratio actually posts a negative
and statistically significant effect on the size and growth rate of public employment
(Tables 1 and 2). These results for the dependency ratio may seem contradicted by the
positive effect of school enrollment rate on public hiring. However, the mean change in
school enrollment is an annual reduction of 16,052 students, a consequence of China’s
one-child policy. Indeed, school principals expressed worry about keeping teachers in
their jobs as the student population steadily declined.16
Summary
In short, the evidence suggests that public hiring patterns are not adequately explained
by non-political factors, including the level of economic development and demand for
public services. Instead, political factors are clearly more dominant. Minority-dominant
provinces that pose a credible secessionist threat display a significantly higher density
of public employment. Simultaneously, leadership turnover is associated with higher
rates of bureaucratic expansion, specifically in the porous section of bureaucracy
amendable to clientelist hiring.
The substantive effects of the ethnic and leadership factors are not strictly
comparable, though it is clear that both factors contribute to bureaucratic size.
TXM (Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia) is a dummy variable, and being a
minority-dominant and hinterland province, according to Model 3 in Table 1, is
associated with having 193,560 more administrative positions than other prov-
inces. A new leader in office registers a smaller effect (an increment of 18,948
positions), but frequent leadership turnover over time can cumulatively account
for a large number of jobs.
It is worth speculating on some conditions under which each of these factors may
exert a stronger effect on public employment. The intensification of secessionist threats
from the TXM provinces may lead the CCP to step up cadre recruitment in these
regions. Although my data do not nearly reach back far enough, one could expect the
period after the CCP crushed a revolt in Tibet and forced the Dalai Lama into exile in
1959 to be an intensive period of minority cadre recruitment in the region. On the
leadership front, I anticipate that clientelist hiring may increase when the elite body is
highly fragmented. That is, the larger the number of factions, the higher the rate of
turnover and thus of bureaucratic growth. Testing these propositions is outside the
scope of this current study. However, I hope this discussion points to some useful
directions for future research.
16 AI 2006–21; AI 200622
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Conclusion
Since the beginning of market liberalization, the central leadership has launched five
major bureaucratic downsizing campaigns. Each time it lambasted the lower levels for
bureaucratic bloat and then proceeded to slash the official number of approved
positions. Yet the total size of public employment has continued to climb, rising from
19 million in 1980 to nearly 50 million by 2007. At the same time, the size of
bureaucracy and pace of expansion has varied across provinces. The purpose of this
article is to explore the political factors that shape the overall growth and regional
distribution of public employment in authoritarian China, where usual electoral expla-
nations fail to apply.
Bureaucratic bloat is not unique to China, but is observed throughout developing
countries. Among electoral regimes, this pattern commonly results from vote buying
and nascent party building. As these factors are absent in China’s single-party dicta-
torship, some instead view bureaucratic expansion as local governments’ defiance of
central mandates to curb excessive hiring. My analysis suggests a more nuanced
perspective by drawing attention to the nested structure of distributive politics in
single-party dictatorships. It would be misleading to treat the Bcentral^ as a homoge-
nous entity that is consistently unified and separate from the Blocal^ levels. The central
layer of China’s political system is itself made up of elite actors with divided goals—on
the one hand, they are part of an elite circle that makes national redistributive and
reform decisions; but, on the other hand, each actor is concerned with extending his or
her own networks of power. As suggested in earlier literature that compares China to
broker-mediated clientelist systems (Oi 1985), each patron at the helm is connected by
long chains of dyadic relationships that reach down to the lowest levels of government.
Hence, the paradox of bureaucratic inflation despite central commands to downsize is
not simply a consequence of defiant and corrupt local agents. Rather, it is a conse-
quence of conflicted goals among central elites and of informal vertical ties that bind
political actors.
Moreover, downsizing mandates in China have not been accompanied by concrete
policy and financial support from the central government. Laying off cadres en masse is
politically destabilizing. Yet local leaders are evaluated on the maintenance of social
stability (Zhao 2013). Incidents of mass protest can provoke dismissals. Therefore,
local leaders do not seriously attempt to remove excess cadres from office, for fear of
jeopardizing social stability and their own careers. Streamlining the administration also
requires paying severance to those who are asked to leave their positions. However,
downsizing campaigns did not come with financial support. Indeed, downsizing
became yet another unfunded mandate imposed by the central government upon the
lower levels. Thus, as my analysis shows, the bulk of bureaucratic expansion has not
occurred in the formal civil service but rather in the subsidiary extra-bureaucracies, as
the latter can earn revenue on the market to finance personnel expenditure. Indirectly,
the inefficiencies and costs of bureaucratic inflation are borne by society in the form of
charge-based services.
More profoundly, the repercussions of bureaucracy in China go beyond issues of
size. The Chinese public and many scholarly observers view the large number of public
personnel as emblematic of an ineffective and overreaching state. It is also worth
noting, however, that despite the ballooning aggregate size of bureaucracy, some
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offices remain understaffed. My interviews suggest that while wealthy and powerful
offices like the tax bureaus are amply staffed, unpopular departments like the civil
affairs bureaus (which administer poverty relief) chronically lack manpower. The
allocation of personnel across party-state functions underscores a normative debate
about what the priorities and limits of governance ought to be in China, a debate that
has gained urgency and contentiousness as societal affluence grows. As my data do not
divide public employment by offices, I am unable to assess the functional distribution
of jobs at this point. Instead, I have taken the first step of disaggregating public
employment across provinces. Future studies may extend this line of research by
unpacking employment patterns both across regions and functions.
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